Building Back Stronger: Hurricane Melissa and the Caribbean’s Recovery Math

1Background: the recovery math of small islands

A hurricane that would be a regional disaster elsewhere can be an economy-wide event on a small island. In 2017, Hurricane Maria caused damages of EC$2.51 billion (US$931 million) and losses of EC$1.03 billion (US$382 million) in Dominica, which amounts to 226% of 2016 gross domestic product. Damage affected approximately 90% of the housing stock, and the identified recovery needs, incorporating the principle of “building back better” where possible, amounted to EC$3.69 billion (US$1.37 billion).^[1]

Eight years later, Jamaica faced a storm of a different scale. The World Bank describes Jamaica as having a well-developed disaster risk financing strategy.^[5] This brief uses Hurricane Melissa to ask three questions. What made the storm so destructive? Which parts of the warning and financing system worked? And what does the first year of recovery show about what rebuilding requires?

2The hazard: an exceptional storm

According to the National Hurricane Center’s final report, Melissa reached category 5 intensity with a minimum central pressure of 892 mb, making it one of the strongest hurricanes on record in the Atlantic basin. It made landfall near New Hope, Jamaica, around 1725 UTC on 28 October as an estimated 160-knot category 5 hurricane. That makes it the strongest hurricane on record to make landfall in Jamaica, and it is tied for the strongest landfall, by maximum sustained wind speed, in the Atlantic basin.^[2]

Three features compounded the danger. First, rapid intensification: Melissa strengthened by 45 knots in 24 hours to become a major hurricane by 0600 UTC on 26 October, and then reached category 5 by 1200 UTC on 27 October. Second, storm surge: it is estimated to have reached 7 to 11 feet above normally dry ground near Crawford and Black River, though no gauge observations were available in Jamaica. Third, rain: storm-total rainfall locally exceeded 32 inches (800 mm) over the interior highlands, and the storm’s slow motion produced catastrophic flooding across portions of the Greater Antilles.^[2]

A rapid analysis by World Weather Attribution, involving researchers from Cuba, Jamaica and other countries, found that one model showed climate change increased Melissa’s maximum wind speeds by 7% and associated rainfall by 16%, and that the atmospheric and oceanic conditions leading to powerful storms are about six times more likely because of climate change.^[9]

3Warning and exposure

On the hazard side, the warning system performed. NHC intensity forecasts beginning on 22 October explicitly indicated rapid intensification between days 3 and 4 of the forecast period, an unusually long lead time, and a hurricane warning was issued for Jamaica about three days before landfall.^[2] Jamaica’s government declared the entire island a threatened area under the Disaster Risk Management Act on 24 October, and on 26 October the Prime Minister ordered the immediate evacuation of seven vulnerable communities, including Port Royal, Portland Cottage, Rocky Point and Old Harbour Bay.^[10] The Jamaica Red Cross had an Imminent DREF of CHF 80,000 in place before landfall to support early action.^[9,8] On the evening of 28 October, almost 15,000 people were in shelters across the island.^[11]

Official deaths in Jamaica were 45, with the highest numbers in St. Elizabeth (18) and Westmoreland (15). The hurricane report notes that a breakdown by cause is unavailable, and that deaths from a subsequent leptospirosis outbreak are not included in the casualty table.^[2] The Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management later reported 12 confirmed leptospirosis deaths as of 7 April.^[8] Haiti recorded 43 deaths, attributed to prolonged heavy rainfall and widespread flooding.^[2]

The exposure was in the buildings. The hurricane report describes extreme winds that destroyed virtually all wooden structures, stripped roofs from most buildings and caused severe damage even to concrete construction. In coastal towns such as New Hope, Crawford and Black River, nearly all roofs were blown off homes. Several hospitals sustained serious structural damage, and some became non-operational.^[2]

4The scale of loss

Estimates of cost rose as assessments matured (Table 1). The World Bank and IDB’s rapid Global Rapid Damage Estimation put physical damage at US$8.8 billion, equivalent to 41% of 2024 GDP, and called Melissa the costliest hurricane in Jamaica’s recorded history. It excluded broader economic losses, which it expected to be even more significant.^[3] The Planning Institute of Jamaica later reported damage, losses and additional costs of J$1.952 trillion (US$12.232 billion), or 56.7% of 2024 GDP.^[4]

Counts of affected buildings tell a similar story of growth in scope. In November, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) reported that the hurricane displaced approximately 30,000 households and damaged more than 130,000 buildings, from partial roof loss to complete collapse.^[7] In December, the UN reported that at least 120,000 buildings had lost their roofs, and that about 450 schools, nearly two-thirds of the national total, had reported significant impacts.^[12] By April, ODPEM data cited by the IFRC listed 215,000 buildings in need of repair, while about 146,000 had sustained major damage.^[8]

The economic effects extend beyond buildings. The hurricane report cites the agriculture minister’s statements that roughly 41,390 hectares of farmland were affected, over 70,000 farmers suffered losses, and more than 1.25 million animals perished.^[2] The UN Resident Coordinator said the destruction had reversed hard-won development gains in a country that was on a positive trajectory.^[12]

5Financing: fast, and small relative to the loss

Jamaica’s disaster risk financing performed as designed. The World Bank announced on 7 November 2025 that Jamaica would receive the full US$150 million under its catastrophe bond, after a third-party calculation agent concluded that Melissa met the pre-agreed parametric triggers. Jamaica first received coverage through a catastrophe bond in 2021 and renewed it with a 2024 bond.^[5] CCRIF announced a record US$70.8 million payout under the tropical cyclone policy on 31 October, three days after the storm, and a second payout of US$21.1 million under the excess rainfall policy on 6 November, together US$91.9 million, both within 14 days.^[13,6] CCRIF states that Jamaica had received five payouts since joining in 2007, amounting to US$122 million including Melissa.^[6] The IFRC’s Emergency Appeal for CHF 19 million was 62.18% funded by 31 May 2026.^[8] Table 2 summarizes the instruments.

The comparison in Figure 1 is the important one. The two parametric instruments provided US$241.9 million, which is about 2.7% of the World Bank and IDB physical damage estimate and about 2.0% of the Planning Institute’s total (our calculation). Parametric payouts are designed to provide immediate liquidity, not to cover the loss. The World Bank’s own release describes the task after such an event as requiring scaled-up and well-coordinated efforts and partnerships across financial instruments.^[3]

6Recovery after one year

The first phase of recovery restored services quickly. In March 2026, the Prime Minister announced that Jamaica had officially entered the reconstruction phase, reporting that electricity was 98% recovered and water 97% restored. He described the reconstruction phase as centered on long-term investment in housing, schools and public infrastructure built to climate-resilient standards.^[14] By the IFRC’s July 2026 update, all 24 hospitals were operational, and the number of active shelters had fallen from 90 shelters and nearly 1,000 occupants to 41 shelters and about 272 occupants.^[8]

Housing is the unfinished task. The same update reports approximately 90,000 households still displaced six months after the storm and approximately 146,000 buildings with major damage, and calls housing recovery one of the most significant unmet needs.^[8] The Jamaica Red Cross completed 640 household shelter assessments, identified 340 households for roof repair, and trained 276 community members in Build Back Safer techniques.^[8]

What to rebuild with has been contested. Three of the country’s leading construction and engineering bodies urged the government to prioritize permanent, hurricane-resilient housing over temporary container units, stating that concrete walls, reinforced roofs, strong fastening systems and professionally supervised construction significantly outperformed makeshift buildings. The Prime Minister had said the National Housing Trust would buy 5,000 container homes at the initial stage; the groups said such units must be treated strictly as temporary emergency shelter.^[15]

7Implications for disaster risk management

Analysis. This section is Disaster Science’s interpretation of the evidence above. It is not drawn from the cited sources.

Treat the roof as the unit of risk. Forecasts, warnings and shelters kept deaths low, but the damage records point to buildings. For hazards of this intensity, the decision that matters most for the next storm is the construction standard and its enforcement for homes, not only the speed of the response.

Plan the financing as layers with different jobs. Parametric instruments provided cash within days, which is exactly what they are for. They covered a few percent of the loss, so recovery planning needs a credible source for the remainder, and clarity on how fast it can arrive.

Rank critical infrastructure first, and test it. Hospitals and schools were among the facilities most affected, and their restoration drives how quickly a community can function. Resilience standards for these facilities should be set above those for typical buildings.

Keep one set of numbers. This brief reports three different counts of buildings and two different counts of people affected. Reconciling damage and displacement data early, in one household-level dataset, makes targeting recovery and measuring progress easier.

Plan for intensity that exceeds history. Because the strongest landfall on record fell on an island that had not previously seen one, design and contingency planning based on past events alone is likely to understate the next one.

8Uncertainty and limitations

Cost estimates. The three estimates in Table 1 measure different things and use different dates. The hurricane report gives US$12.2 billion as physical damage equal to 41% of 2024 GDP, which does not match the World Bank and IDB figure of US$8.8 billion for that percentage, so this brief takes the percentages from the originating sources.^[2,3,4] The IDB and ECLAC damage and loss assessment itself could not be accessed, and the Planning Institute’s figures are taken from press coverage of its briefing.

People and buildings. Counts of people affected differ widely, for example 626,000 in a UN statement and about 1.6 million in the IFRC update, and counts of damaged buildings vary by date and definition.^[12,8,7] Deaths are the official count of 45 and exclude later leptospirosis deaths.^[2,8]

Attribution. The 7% and 16% figures come from one model in a rapid, non-peer-reviewed analysis. This brief draws on the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre’s report of that analysis, not on the full study.^[9]

Timing. The most recent recovery data cited are from the IFRC’s July 2026 update, with several figures dated 7 April. Conditions on the first anniversary may differ.^[8]

Scope. This brief synthesizes official reports, agency releases and news reports. It presents no original field data and is an editorial synthesis that has not undergone peer review.